ABSTRACT The Internet of Things (IoT) has been widely used because of its high efficiency and real-time collaboration. A wireless sensor network is the core technology to support the operation of the IoT, and the security problem is becoming more and more serious. Aiming at the problem that the existing malicious node detection methods in wireless sensor networks cannot be guaranteed by fairness and traceability of detection process, we present a blockchain trust model (BTM) for malicious node detection in wireless sensor networks. First, it gives the whole framework of the trust model. Then, it constructs the blockchain data structure which is used to detect malicious nodes. Finally, it realizes the detection of malicious nodes in 3D space by using the blockchain smart contract and the WSNs' quadrilateral measurement localization method, and the voting consensus results are recorded in the blockchain distributed. The simulation results show that the model can effectively detect malicious nodes in WSNs, and it can also ensure the traceability of the detection process.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Internet and perceptual technology, Internet of Things (IoT) [1] emerged as an important force to promote economic and social development. As the key technology in the IoT architecture, wireless sensor network (WSNs) plays a key role in promoting the development of IoT, which has remarkable practical significance and research value. Wireless sensor networks [2] , [3] are mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) composed of distributed micro-devices embedded with various sensing abilities (call sensors), which have the characteristics of the wide coverage area, high precision monitoring, remote monitoring, rapid deployment, self-organization and high fault tolerance. Now WSNs are widely used in numerous areas, such as military, smart home, commercial and other fields [4] . However, the sensor nodes have certain limitations-they are easily damaged and have limited power, computational ability, memory and transmission range [5] . Moreover, they can
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Tie Qiu. be easily compromised by an adversary [6] . According to statistics, the threats faced by WSNs mainly come from two aspects [7] , [8] . On the one hand, the external attacker attacks the network, and on the other hand, the internal node is invaded and controlled to become a malicious node to launch an attack from within. Hence, it is an urgent security problem for wireless sensor networks to have the ability to identify and eliminate internal malicious nodes. And how to solve this security problem has a profound impact on the healthy development of the IoT [9] . For this reason, the network security of WSNs has attracted the attention of many researchers.
The problem of malicious node detection in wireless sensor networks has been widely studied. The methods can be divided into two categories: one is based on the trust model and the other is based on WSNs protocol. The former is the most common method.
In order to solve the trust problem of the malicious node detection in WSN, Zawaideh et al. [10] improved the algorithm of determining based on neighbor weight trust (NWTD). The algorithm periodically updated the trust degree of nodes and set the minimum threshold of acceptable trust for nodes. Thus, it can realize the separated malicious nodes. Aiming at the problem of malicious node detection in WSNs, Zeng et al. [11] provided a trust mechanism based on D-S (Dempster-Shafer) evidence theory to consider the indirect and direct trust of third-party nodes. It ensured the robustness of the network and the validity of the data packet. Compared with [11] , Su et al. [12] proposed a trust model based on the calculation of trust degree and considered both direct and indirect trust levels with the considering the internal attacks faced by wireless sensor networks. This model reduced the network energy consumption and set the trust threshold to assist the decision through the periodically updating the trust degree. And it can also effectively distinguish the malicious nodes to ensure the security and reliability of the network from the aging nodes. In order to solve the uncertainty of the decision made by the traditional trust mechanism, it regarded the message success rate, node delay, correctness and fairness as trust measures. Prabha and Latha [13] proposed a multi-attribute trust model which was based on fuzzy processing to calculate the final trust value of each node. It proved the accuracy of the decision. Zhang et al. [14] proposed a new trust management scheme based on D-S evidence theory. Firstly, considering the spatio-temporal correlation of data collected by adjacent sensor nodes, and then according to D-S theory, the trust model was established. Finally, the whole trust degree was calculated to identify the malicious nodes. To solve the problems of the single detection function by malicious node identification system and the inability, Yang et al. [15] proposed a new malicious node recognition model to resist malicious libel behavior of highreputation nodes in existing WSNs. This model presented the indirect credibility of the third-party nodes and the reputation distribution by using Beta Distribution, and integrated the trust values corresponding to various attack types to ensure the accurate identification of malicious nodes.
Besides the malicious node method based on the trust mechanism, another kind of protocol detection method based on WSNs is also widely used. In order to solve the low processing capacity of WSNs, Das and Das [16] proposed an enhanced LEACH protocol, which can detect energy consumption, distance and malicious nodes to ensure the robustness of wireless sensor networks. To detect malicious nodes and enhance network security, Chen et al. [17] presented a new multi-valued trust routing protocol (MTR) that is based on sensor trust and the number of hops from sensor nodes to base station (BS) to ensure network stability. To solve the problem of malicious nodes spoofing their identity and location in WSNs, Atassi et al. [18] proposed a decentralized malicious node detection technique based on received signal strength indicator (RSSI). To solve the problem of identity attacks by malicious nodes through wireless signals in wireless network communications, Pinto et al. [19] proposed a new strategy based on machine learning. It used two classifiers to process and analyze real-time samples of received signal strength, and optimize the case of legitimate nodes and attack nodes whose landmarks are close to each other.
Althunibat et al. [20] proved that both dependent and independent malicious nodes have the same effect on the overall performance of WSNs in terms of detection and false alarm rate. Uddin et al. [21] proposed a model for detecting power distribution side fault points by using WSNs technology. Based on current sensor and wireless protocols, the model realizes the process of wireless monitoring, detecting and locating fault nodes.
The above literatures proposed effective methods to the problem of malicious node detection in wireless sensor networks. However, they did not mention how to record the detection process of malicious nodes, nor the mechanism to safely save the original data for later traceability.
The emergence of Blockchain technology [22] , [23] and smart contract [24] , [25] provides a new way for the detection of malicious nodes in wireless sensor networks. Smart contract can automatically and distributedly perform predefined operations when abnormal behavior occurs or boundary conditions are triggered, and all relevant data are formed into data blocks that can be traced, verified, and with timing characteristics. Ellul and Pace [26] proposed a smart contract for detecting virtual machines, which realized the interaction between the blockchain system and the IoT device under limited conditions, and promoted the automation of verifiable blockchain transactions. Islam and Kundu [27] proposed a smart contract based on blockchain to guarantee personal privacy and information security in the homesharing economy. Kang et al. [28] combined smart contract with blockchains and proposed a renewable energy trading platform that can automatically implement transactions. Likewise, Pan et al. [29] proposed an Edge Chain framework for edge devices in the IoT [30] by using smart contract to implement blockchain management of behavior, resources and accounts of IoT edge devices. Zhang et al. [31] proposed a framework based on smart contract to solve the problems of trusted access control and distributed in the IoT. In this paper, it proposes a blockchain trust model for malicious node detection in WSNs. It provides a more secure, credible and reliable solution for malicious node detection and traceability of detection process in WSNs. It not only restrains the interference of malicious nodes to the normal operation of the network, but also ensures the transparency and traceability of the detection process. At the same time, it avoids the space limitation to some extent.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we propose a blockchain trust model for malicious node detection in WSNs; Sec. III carries out simulation experiments and analysis of the model; and Sec. IV includes the summary of the paper and future work.
II. BTM FOR MALICIOUS NODE DETECTION IN WSNs
In this section, we propose a blockchain trust model for malicious node detection in wireless sensor networks. First of all, we introduce the overall structure involved in the blockchain trust model in Sec. II-A. The data structure of the model is constructed in Sec. II-B. The smart contract of the model is designed in Sec. II-C where we present the formal expression of the smart contract and discuss indicators of evaluating malicious nodes by smart contract, then we give WSN location method in smart contract. 
A. MODEL ARCHITECTURE
As shown in the top half of Fig. 1 , in wireless sensor networks, we consider dividing the nodes into bs, sn and sensor [32] . The sensor monitors the indicators of the area in real time, collects monitoring data, understands the running status, and uploads the integrated data to the associated sn through the cellular link; sn collects all the monitoring data uploaded by the sensor in the transmission range, analyzes the running status of the sensor in real time, and collects the results to the bs center through the backhaul network.
As shown in the lower part of Fig. 1 , we map the operating framework of the wireless sensor network into the Consortium Blockchain. There are four main types of nodes in the Consortium Blockchain: contract issuing node, CA node, verification node and common nodes. bs is the contract publishing node, responsible for publishing intelligent contracts, as the issuer of activities.
The sn serves as both CA node and verification node. CA node provides digital certificate-based identity information to members of the Consortium Blockchain community (Each sn and the sensor in the communication range is an alliance), and can generate or cancel a member's identity certificate. On the basis of clear membership, the organization can implement the management of authority control. The verification node is served by the pre-selected sn. It is mainly responsible for receiving the monitoring data collected by the common node, processing the smart contract, checking the legality of the transaction data, and updating and maintaining the node data and the account status in the blockchain organization. Among them, the smart contract is a piece of code that is deployed on the distributed ledger, which can control the received external information. In particular, the generation of each block is determined by all pre-selected nodes, and stored in C mndb . The sensor is a normal node and only uploads the collected monitoring data, regardless of the accounting process.
Therefore, based on their common characteristics, the overall structure of the wireless sensor network can be mapped into the Consortium Blockchain network, and then the detection of malicious nodes in the blockchain network. The blockchain trust model (BTM) for malicious node detection in WSNs is formalized as follows:
Definition 1: BTM is a 8-tuple set.
where: 1) BS = {bs i |i ∈ N + } is the finite set of base stations. 2) SN = {sn j |j ∈ N + } is the finite set of cluster heads.
} is the finite set of sensors.
4) C mndb is a malicious node detection blockchain. 
B. THE BLOCKCHAIN DATA STRUCTURE FOR MALICIOUS NODE DETECTION
In order to better describe the C mndb blockchain, this paper proposes a block data structure based on malicious node detection blockchain (C mndb − BDS). It is different from the traditional WSNs where it cannot be repeatedly detected. C mndb − BDS records all communication data. As shown in Fig. 2 , the data structure is mainly divided into two parts. On the one hand, the block header mainly VOLUME 7, 2019 contains the hash value of the previous block where the hash value is used to connect the previous block and meet the needs of the integrity of the C mndb blockchain. On the other hand, the block body contains the main information of the wireless sensor node in the block, such as location, ID, state, DT , FR, RT , N S and N F (see Sec. II-C). This information together with the hash value of the previous block and the random number form the hash value of the block.
Here, D1 -Dn represents each sensor data collected by sensor, Hash1 is the hash pointer of D1 sensor data, Hash12 is the hash pointer of Hash1 + Hash2, so the layer stack is added, and finally the unique Merkle-root is generated.
C mndb not only uses a ''block + chain'' chain data structure, but also records the information collected by each block in the form of a Merkle Tree formed by a hash pointer. Such a data structure makes it possible to change the hash pointer of the block once the data of any block is modified, thereby ensuring that the data cannot be tampered with. In addition, using the data structure of C mndb − BDS, the data is recorded by multiple sensors when the whole network is released to reduce the possibility of malicious manipulation, ensure safety and fairness, and improve the convenience of the detection process.
C. SMART CONTRACT OF THE MODEL
A smart contract is a piece of code that is deployed on a distributed ledger [33] that controls the received outside information. The C mndb blockchain leverages the smart contract platform provided by Decentralized Application (DAPP) to increase its flexibility and operability.
1) MALICIOUS NODE DETECTION METHOD IN SMART CONTRACT
The smart contract of malicious node detection blockchain (C mndb −SC) is proposed in this paper that contains the following relationships:
Here, the bs is the publisher of C mndb −SC; the sn is the aggregation node that the bs authorizes to vote; the δ is the malicious sensor evaluation indicator which has DT , FR and RT ; η is the reputation of the node; and C mndb − BDS is the data structure of the C mndb ; QM is the WSNs positioning method.
As shown in Fig. 3 , the specific steps for using smart contract to detect malicious nodes are as follows:
Step 1. The bs releases smart contract C mndb −SC to the entire network.
Step 2. The bs authorizes the sn to become a voter of the C mndb −SC.
Step 3. The sn locates all sensor according to (6) in QM, so that the position and ID of sensor are in one-toone correspondence, and then a complete NLL is obtained. Step 4. The sn determines the state of the sensor based on the actual situation.
Step 5. Under the working state of the sensor node, the collected sensor information is calculated by (1-3) to obtain the corresponding DT , FR and RT . Step 9. Finally, based on the obtained η, the sn uses the Vote() to vote on the ID of malicious sensor.
(The function Vote() may be divided into three parts: Firstly, set an appropriate voting threshold ε according to the actual scene; Then, sn determines the range of the η of all the sensors in the coverage area. If η > ε, then the sensor is malicious; finally, the ID of the malicious sensor is cast.) Step 10. According to the ID of the cast, look at the NLL and find the corresponding sensor location.
2) MALICIOUS NODE DETECTION METHOD IN SMART CONTRACT
Because the evaluation of malicious nodes is subjective and uncertain, in this paper it takes the state of node, processing delay, forwarding rate and response time as the evaluation indicators of malicious nodes to improve the credit degree of nodes. In order to better describe the state of the sensor node in the network environment, it is divided into working state and non-working state. If the sensor nodes are not working, we directly remove from the network; otherwise, collect the following three factors:
a: DELAYED TRANSMISSION (DT) FACTORS
Analyzing the time when nodes forward packets will meet the needs of identifying malicious nodes in WSNs, and improve the effectiveness of network data collection. During a certain time interval, we count the time from the receipt of the complete packet to the end of the packet forwarding, and calculate the proportion of the time in the interval. The calculation formula is given by
Here, Tsensor_id is the time from the receipt of the complete packet to the end of the packet forwarding of sensor_id; T 1 is a certain time interval.
b: FORWARDING RATE (FR) FACTOR
To prevent malicious nodes from tampering with forwarding packets, it is necessary to evaluate the integrity of forwarded packets. When the source node sends the data packet, the next hop node is monitored in a certain time whether the data forwarding is performed correctly. The calculation formula is given by
Here, sd is the amount of data sent by the node; td is the total amount of data received by the node.
c: RESPONSE TIME (RT) FACTOR
Response time is a very important evaluation factor in some special situations (e.g. disaster, fire detection), which is mainly reflected in the communication delay process. Therefore, in order to identify a malicious node, the response time speed of the node needs to be evaluated. During a certain time interval, we count the time from the start of the request until the receipt of valid data, and calculate the proportion of the time in the interval. The calculation formula is given by
Here, dbn is the number of data bits; bw is the network bandwidth; pd is the propagation distance; ps is the propagation speed; pt is the processing time; and T 2 is a certain time interval.
Therefore, the final node communication quality (NCQ) is given by
Here, γ , λ and σ are the weights of delayed transmission, forwarding rate, and response time respectively. It can be adjusted according to the specific scene to meet the requirements of γ + λ + σ = 1.
In this paper, we set a threshold κ that can be adjusted according to the specific scenario. When NCQ ≤ κ, the number of successful communications N S of the node is increase. Conversely, it increases the number of failed communications N F of the node.
Finally, calculate the credit of the node based on the distribution [34] , N S and N F .
Similarly, when η ≤ ε, the sensor is determined to be a malicious node.
3) WSN POSITIONING METHOD IN SMART CONTRACT
Sensor location data is very important for WSNs in certain scenarios. When a disaster occurs (e.g. an earthquake, a forest fire, a natural gas leak), Wireless sensor network-based monitoring does not mean much if it only knows that a serious incident has occurred but does not know its specific location. Therefore, all sensor location information contained in the entire WSNs is stored in the sensor node.
However, because the number of sensors in WSNs is too numerous, it is difficult for sensor network systems to obtain location information of all nodes at an early stage. In this paper, the terminal node in a network is grouped into two, namely anchor node-set (AN) and unknown locations nodeset (ULN). Among them, AN represents a special class that knows its own location, and ULN represents a class of nodes that do not know their locations. Every node has a same node location list (NLL) which has node ID and location. The initial list only contains the location information of the anchor node. In order to obtain the location information of all nodes, this paper proposes a quadrilateral measurement (QM) method in [35] , which can acquire nodes of unknown locations, and then improve the unified NLL. To meet the needs of quickly monitoring the state and behavior of the sensor in real time, so as to quickly obtaining their location. The above method can improve NLL written to the smart contract block chain, the detailed flowchart shown in Fig. 4 : The QM method mentioned above can be described by the following simple example: Hypothesis A(x 1 , y 1 , z 1 ) , 4 is the distance from U to A, B, C, D, the position data calculation formula of U is given by
III. SIMULATION
To validate the performance of our proposed model, we conduct the simulation experiment on the BTM model. Firstly, we present the network environment required to build BTM in Sec. III-A. Then, the simulation results are analyzed in Sec. III-B. Finally, Sec. III-C analyze the performance of the model.
A. MODEL BUDLING
In order to verify the effectiveness of the method, this paper uses Truffle as a smart contract development framework and build tool. A contract abstract interface that can directly operate contract functions in JavaScript through web3.js. Ganache-cli is a private-chain local simulation tool that mines faster than Geth. Npm is built as a project in development, including management and staging servers, etc. Solidity is the language of smart contract development. We consider running Truffle and Ganache-cli on the sensor node. In addition, in order to better simulate the wireless sensor network environment, we conduct simulations by using OPNET network simulation software to collect and analyze the key parameters. The contents of the simulation are as follows: the simulation scenario is set to 1000m × 1000m × 500m cube disaster mountainous area where 50 nodes are randomly deployed (5 sn nodes, 45 sensor nodes). Assuming that the sn node is the legitimate node, there are malicious nodes in the sensor node. In order to locate the sensor node accurately, the NLL is obtained by using QM to locate the sensor node in three-dimensional space. Smart contract that receives the key parameters of the sensor node, such as state, DT , FR, RT , N S and N F , calculates the NCQ and η. All sn node can only vote for a malicious node based on η for the sensor node within the scope of their own communication. In addition, all sn nodes comply with the content specified in the smart contract and records it on the blockchain.
B. SENSOR STATISTICS EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we verify the feasibility of the BTM model from two aspects.
1) SENSOR 3D SPATIAL LOCATION AND CLUSTERING
To understand the state of the sensor node in real time and avoid the failure to react in time when a disaster occurs, it is necessary to position the sensor. As shown in Fig. 5 , it is an effect diagram of positioning processing of 45 sensor nodes according to QM. The black spot is the anchor node, ie. the sn node. The green circle is the unknown node, ie. the sensor node. And the red star is the node after positioning with QM. From this figure we can get the accuracy of QM positioning. Moreover, to better manage the sensor node in the communication range of each sn node, we perform clustering processing on all sensor nodes. Table 1 shows the contract addresses for each sn node in a smart contract. Table 2 shows the sensor_id and numbers covered by each sn node.
2) SENSOR STATISTICS
Since we want to detect malicious sensor nodes better, we consider letting the sn node collect some parameters about the sensor, such as state, DT , FR, RT , N S and N F . However, in order to ensure the fairness of the detection, Table 3 only shows the information of the sensor node in the communication range of the sn node. Here state = 0 means the sensor is not working, state = 1 means the sensor is working, ''−−'' means no information.
The specific detecting process as follows. First of all, sn node puts some sensor key parameters into C mndb − SC, as shown in Table 4 . Then, we calculate the key parameters according to (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) in C mndb − SC, and get the corresponding NCQ and η as shown in Table 5 . Table 6 shows the NCQ and η in the communication range in the smart contract. As shown in Fig. 6 , it shows all the η of sensor nodes. (Since the solidity language only supports integers, when the smart contract input data is called, the collected data is expanded accordingly. There is a slight error between the calculation result and the direct calculation data.)
C. MODEL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 1) MODEL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this paper, it uses the distributed chained data structure so that the sensor node information recorded in each block on the chain can be traced back from the previous block, and affect the sensor node information of the next block record directly. If the node wants to tamper with past sensor data, the local data recorded by the sensor node must be changed by 51%. Such a large complexity process data can not be tampered. In addition, the model uses public key cryptosystem, merkle tree, hash and ECDSA signature algorithm to ensure data integrity and security.
2) MODEL RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
This paper uses the decentralized storage feature of Blockchain technology to spread the workload to the network, record all sensor node data in a distributed way, and form a chain structure in a chronological manner. When one VOLUME 7, 2019 node fails, other nodes will not be affected, avoiding single point failure and enhancing the stability and reliability of the system. At the same time, the smart contract is added to the blockchain by means of digitized code. When the contract trigger condition is met, the code of the smart contract will be automatically started. Once the malicious sensor node is authenticated, it will be recorded in the blockchain network in time so that it can prevent the loss of information asymmetry caused by time difference to the whole wireless sensor network.
3) TRACEABILITY ANALYSIS
In this model, it uses distributed data blocks linked in timestamped order, and all sensor nodes are stored permanently. The information of the sensor node is bound to each data record in the link. The whole process is transparent and traceable, realizing dynamic update of data records in real time, and ensuring traceability of original data. It makes up for the problems of opacity, traceability and injustice in the traditional WSNs process of detecting malicious nodes. When malicious behavior occurs in WSNs, the identity of the attacking node can be identified by traceability of the model, and corresponding measures can be taken to prevent the further impact of such malicious nodes on the network.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nowadays, the malicious node detection in WSNs mostly adopts the way of one-time centralized decision-making. According to this method, the original data cannot be traced back, the detection process is difficult to reproduce and check, and the problems of error and false positives are difficult to avoid. In this paper, through 3D space it is realized by using block chain intelligent contract and WSNs quadrilateral measurement for localization of the detection of malicious nodes in, and the consensus results of voting are recorded in the blockchain distributed. The simulation results show that the model can effectively detect malicious nodes in WSNs and ensure the traceability of the detection process.
At present, the model is still in the theoretical research stage, and there is still room for further research and improvement. In the next step, we will improve the model from the following two aspects: 1) Get more engineering and experimental data, and fit the NCQ and η in the formal model BTM to meet the practical needs.
2) The consensus method in the model is the traditional POW workload proof method, which requires relatively large computational power and high energy consumption, so it is not especially suitable for the running environment of wireless sensor networks. The next step will improve and experiment the combination of PoS and other methods.
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